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On December 7, 2015, in the wake of the fatal shooting of 
Laquan McDonald by Chicago Police Officer Jason Van Dyke, the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Illinois jointly initiated 
an investigation into the City of Chicago’s Police Department (CPD) 
and its in-house accountability agencies, the Independent Police 
Review Authority (IPRA) and the Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA). 
The DOJ then issued its Investigation Report, in which it concluded 
that it had found reasonable cause to believe that the CPD routinely 
engages in patterns or practices of using force in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
1
 The DOJ 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A. in Russian and Slavic Studies, New York University, May 2013.  
1
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILL., Investigation of the Chicago Police Department (Jan. 
13, 2017). 
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determined that those unlawful patterns or practices were the result of 
systemic deficiencies in training and accountability. Specifically, the 
DOJ found that IPRA and the BIA fail to conduct meaningful 
investigations into instances of police misconduct, thereby allowing, 
and implicitly encouraging, the continuation of those practices.
2
 
Nowhere was this problem more prevalent than in predominantly 
black and Latino communities.
3
  
The DOJ’s investigation delved into racial, ethnic, and other 
disparities in the CPD’s force and accountability practices, and found 
that community trust has been broken by systems that have allowed 
CPD officers who violate the law to escape accountability.
4
 The DOJ 
also determined that the CPD’s accountability systems were broadly 
ineffective at deterring and detecting officer misconduct, and at 
holding officers accountable if and when they violate the law or CPD 
policy.
5
 Further, because attempts by investigators to hold officers 
accountable for misconduct have been frustrated by the “code of 
silence”
6
 and the “pervasive cover-up culture”
7
 among CPD officers, 
the potential for inappropriate coordination of testimony and risk of 
collusion are effectively built into the system.
8
 Thus, IPRA and the 
BIA accept the CPD’s culture and well-recognized code of silence as 
“immutable fact[s] rather than []thing[s] to root out.”
9
 
Though the DOJ Report focused primarily on the lack of 
accountability inherent in the agencies created to review instances of 
                                                 
2
 Id. at 145. 
3
 Id. at 144. In Chicago, black and Latino citizens account for approximately 
sixty-one-percent of the city’s population. Id. at 144. 
4
 Id.  
5
 In fact, during the five years preceding the DOJ’s Investigation, the City 
received over 30,000 complaints of police misconduct, yet fewer than two percent 
were sustained by IPRA or the BIA. Id. at 7. 
6
 The City, police officers, leadership within the CPD, its police officer union, 
and even the Mayor openly acknowledge that a code of silence among officers 
exists. Id. at 75. 
7
 Id. at 47. 
8
 Id. at 8. 
9
 Id. at 47. 
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officer misconduct, that institutional deficiency is only part of the 
problem. Between 1995 and 2015, federal prosecutors nationwide 
declined to levy charges against U.S. law enforcement officers alleged 
to have committed civil rights violations in 12,703 of 13,233 referrals 
made by the FBI and other agencies.
10
 That 96% rejection rate, when 
contrasted with a 23% rejection rate for all other allegations of 
criminal activity in the same period,
11
 illustrates the proverbial shield 




As a result of those institutional deficiencies, the burden of 
deterring police misconduct has effectively fallen on the victims 
themselves. Not only is this result fundamentally unfair to those whose 
rights have been violated by law enforcement, the primary tools at 
those victims’ disposal
13
 have yet to translate into an effective system 
for detecting and deterring police misconduct.
14
 Civil plaintiffs who 
bring charges against law enforcement officers are hampered by 
evidentiary and procedural difficulties, including but not limited to the 
                                                 
10
 Brian Bowling & Andrew Conte, Trib Investigation: Cops Often Let Off 
Hook for Civil Rights Complaints, TRIB LIVE (Mar. 12, 2016, 6:00 PM), 
http://triblive.com/usworld/nation/9939487-74/police-rights-civil. 
11
 Id.  
12
 Craig Futterman, founder of the Civil Rights and Police Accountability 
Project at the University of Chicago opined that “[t]his is an area where the feds 
need to be bolder and put greater resources in . . . [i]ndeed the failure to aggressively 
bring those cases has allowed too many abusive officers to believe that they can 
operate without fear of punishment.” Brian Bowling & Andrew Conte, supra note 
10.  
13
 42 U.S.C. §1983 and state law claims brought pursuant to that statute’s 
purpose.  
14
 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial 
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination 
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 548 (citing longitudinal studies conducted by the 
Federal Judicial Center on summary judgment that show a particularly high rate of 
termination by summary judgment in civil rights and employment discrimination 
cases (70% and 73%, respectively)—the highest of any type of federal civil case—
and opining that these trends raise important questions as to whether meritorious 
cases are being decided and dismissed on incomplete factual records in the federal 
courts). 
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established “code of silence” among police officers and exceptionally 
high procedural burdens shouldered by civil rights plaintiffs in the pre-
trial stages of litigation.
15
 These two factors combined often turn 
§1983 suits into credibility contests, with one party enjoying great 
deference based on the authority vested in an officer displaying a star 
over his or her heart. Yet while the improper, perfunctory grant of 
deference to police officers has been mistakenly cited as an issue that 
plagues citizens serving on the jury, that cognitive bias has shown to 
often affect judges at the federal level.
16
  
Judges have traditionally followed three basic restrictive rules 
on the motion for summary judgment: the evidence is to be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the credibility of witnesses 
is not to be evaluated, and contradictory evidence is not to be 
weighed.”
17
 Yet federal court judges have read the Supreme Court’s 
1986 “Summary Judgment Trilogy,”
18
 as a directive to be more 
receptive to summary judgment in ways that are more striking than 
anything actually articulated in those three cases.
19
 As a result, judges 
have stepped into the role of the jury, effectively removing an essential 
element of our adversarial system through procedural mechanisms. 
Not only has this practice resulted in judgments against plaintiffs in an 
unprecedented number of civil rights cases at the summary judgment 
                                                 
15
 Id. at 520 (noting that it is widely recognized that civil rights plaintiffs face 
enormous hurdles in federal court and, as a result, there appears to be a disparate 
impact on employment discrimination and civil rights cases).  
16
 Schneider, supra note 14, at 564-66 (listing cognitive bias, lack of judicial 
humility, incapacity to see issues outside their own perspective, and deep skepticism 
of civil rights cases as factors that help explain the results of the 2009 Clermont & 
Schwab study, which revealed that jury trials result in considerably more favorable 
verdicts for civil rights plaintiffs than bench trials).   
17
 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation 
Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clinches Eroding Our Day in Court 
and Jury Trial Commitments? 78 N.Y.U.L. REV. 982, 1057-58.  
18
 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574 (1986). 
19
 Miller, supra note 17, at 1071.  
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 it also runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tolan v. 
Cotton just three years ago.
21
  
In Tolan, the Court chastised the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for failing to “adhere to the axiom that in 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the 
nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 
drawn in his favor.”
22
 The Court’s harsh criticism of the Fifth Circuit 
in Tolan should have served as a much needed reminder to federal 
judges across the nation as it explicitly stated that “though [the Court] 
is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower 
federal courts,” it “felt compelled to intervene in Tolan’s case” 
because “the opinion below reflect[ed] a clear misapprehension of 
summary judgment standards in light of [its] precedents.”
23
  
Yet the Fifth Circuit is not alone. The Seventh Circuit similarly 
misapplied the summary judgment standard in Colbert v. City of 
Chicago, et al.,
24
 when it affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Chicago police officers despite 
numerous disputes over facts material to the plaintiffs’ respective 
claims. In Colbert, the Seventh Circuit majority failed to review the 
lower court’s legal conclusions de novo and stepped into the role 
traditionally reserved for the jury, taking it upon themselves to resolve 
credibility disputes in favor of the police officer-defendants, which 
effectively transformed officer testimony into undisputed facts in the 
record at the summary judgment stage. 
Thus, while the Court’s expansion of summary judgment as a 
procedural tool was designed to control both the volume of litigation 
overall and its scope in any particular case, federal judges across the 
nation have used that mechanism to supplant the role of the jury in our 
                                                 
20
 Schneider, supra note 14, at 520 (noting that the greater impact of the 
change in the landscape of federal pretrial practice is the dismissal of civil rights and 
employment discrimination cases from federal courts in disproportionate numbers). 
21
 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014). 
22
 Id. at 1863, citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (1986). 
23
 Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1868. 
24
 Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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 Though this degradation of the adversarial system 
through misapplication of the summary judgment standard has 
undoubtedly reached all types of claims, nowhere is it more prevalent 
or more unjust than in the context of claims brought by minority 
plaintiffs against those acting under the color of law.
26
 
This article uses Colbert to examine the ways in which our 
justice system deteriorates when judges usurp the role of the jury at the 
pretrial stages of litigation, especially in the context of civil rights 
claims. Nowhere is this improper use of judicial authority more 
prevalent, or more harmful, than in the Seventh Circuit, which has 
jurisdiction in most cases involving the City of Chicago and its law 
enforcement officers. This article concludes by contending that, in 
light of the DOJ’s warnings about the pervasiveness of police 
                                                 
25
 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Scott v. Harris provides a dramatic 
example of this problem. 550 U.S. 372 (2007). Scott involved a §1983 action 
brought by a motorist against the police and other officials claiming that those 
officials used excessive force during a high-speed chase in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment Rights. Id. at 375-76. The district court denied defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 376. On certiorari, 
eight Justices reversed the denial and entered judgment for the defendant after 
watching a videotape of the chase. Id. at 386. Those justices concluded that “no 
reasonable jury” could find for the plaintiff, which triggered a vigorous dissent from 
Justice Stevens. Id. at 379-80. In that dissent, Justice Stevens referred to the Justices 
in the majority as “my colleagues on the jury,” Id. at 392 (Stevens, J, dissenting), 
and criticized the Court for having “usurped the jury’s factfinding function and, in 
doing so, implicitly labeling the four other judges to review the case unreasonable.” 
Id. at 395. He further noted that “if two groups of judges can disagree so vehemently 
about the nature of the pursuit and the circumstances surrounding that pursuit, it 
seems eminently likely that a reasonable juror could disagree with this Court’s 
characterization of events.” Id. at 396; see also Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & 
Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 894-902 (2009) (discussing 
the importance of “judicial humility”). 
26
 Schneider, supra note 14, at 542-43 (noting that because civil rights cases 
often involve subtle issues of credibility, inferences, and close legal questions, where 
issues concerning the “genuineness” and “materiality” of the facts are frequently 
intertwined with law, a single district judge may be a less fair decisionmaker than 
jurors, who are likely to be far more diverse and to bring a broader range of 
perspectives to bear on the problem).  
6
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misconduct and the ineffectiveness of the CPD’s accountability 
systems, the Seventh Circuit must resist the temptation to grant 
improper deference to Chicago Police Department officers, redouble 
its efforts to properly evaluate summary judgment orders, and reverse 
them in cases in which plaintiffs have raised genuine issues of material 
fact that, if taken as true as required by Rule 56, would allow a 
reasonable factfinder to conclude that those plaintiffs’ rights were 
violated by those officers.  
Part I of this article discusses the private civil remedies 
available to plaintiffs who have suffered civil rights violations by law 
enforcement, specifically those brought by the respective plaintiffs in 
Colbert—42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Illinois common law intentional 
tort of malicious prosecution—and the unintended consequences of the 
Supreme Court’s transformation of the summary judgment standard 
since its inception. Part II provides an overview of the factual and 
procedural background of Colbert v. Willingham, et al.
27
 Part III 
examines the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Chicago Police Officers on all counts. Part IV then discusses the 
Seventh Circuit majority’s opinion in Colbert v. City of Chicago, et 
al., contrasting it with that of Judge David Hamilton, who dissented in 
part. Finally, Part IV applauds Judge Hamilton for avoiding the 
temptation to step into the role reserved exclusively for juries in 
American jurisprudence, and argues that his approach ensures fairness 
to parties seeking to enforce the protections guaranteed by our 
Constitution and is consistent with the Supreme Court’s summary 
judgment precedent and the stated goals of 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
 
  
                                                 
27
 Colbert v. Willingham, et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015). 
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A.  Private Civil Remedies Available to Civil Rights Plaintiffs 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. §1983 
 
Section 1983 was enacted on April 20, 1871 as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, and was the first statute to create a federal claim 
for civil rights violations.
28
 Later amended and codified, the Act 
affords a civil cause of action for any person deprived of any rights, 
privileges or immunities secured by the United States Constitution or 
other federal law by another person who was acting under color of any 
state law, statute, ordinance, custom or usage.
29
 Section 1983 is not 
itself a source of substantive rights, but rather provides a vehicle for 
the vindication of rights elsewhere conferred. Some of the most 
common claims brought pursuant to §1983, and those upon which this 
article is focused, are claims predicated on the Fourth Amendment, 
which protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 




Despite the formal recognition of this private remedy for 
violations of federal law, however, civil suits brought pursuant to 
§1983 were a rarity until the Supreme Court’s 1961 decision in 
Monroe v. Pape.
31
 In Monroe, the Court for the first time explicitly 
stated that the “under color of” provision of §1983 applied as well to 
unconstitutional actions taken without state authority as to 
                                                 
28




 U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. 
31
 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (reversing the Seventh Circuit’s 
dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim brought against several Chicago police officers who 
searched plaintiffs’ home and arrested them without a warrant, holding that the 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures contained in the Fourth 
Amendment was applicable to the states by reason of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment) (overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 
8
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unconstitutional action authorized by the state.
3233
 Further, in 1998, the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Ramirez broadened its traditional 
determination of what may constitute an unreasonable search pursuant 
to §1983 to encompass the manner in which that search was 
conducted.
34
 Noting that the “general touchstone of reasonableness 
which governs Fourth Amendment analysis governs the method of 
execution of the warrant,” the Court concluded that “excessive or 
unnecessary destruction of property during a search may violate the 
Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the 
fruits of the search not subject to suppression.”
35
  
In order to establish actionable individual liability under 
§1983, the Supreme Court has held that “it is enough to show that the 
official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a 
federal right.”
3637
 The Seventh Circuit has echoed the Court’s 
                                                 
 
32
 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 236. 
33
 The increased availability of federal remedies for plaintiffs whose 
Constitutional rights had been violated by persons acting under color of state law 
was enhanced by the codification of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 
1976, which allows the award of “a reasonable attorney’s fee” to the “prevailing 
party” in certain civil rights cases, including those brought pursuant to §1983. Courts 
have since routinely held that prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys’ 
fees unless special circumstances would render an award unjust, thereby allowing 
poor plaintiffs adequate representation and civil rights attorneys an opportunity to 
take cases that may result in minimal monetary damages. This practice reflects the 
Supreme Court’s view that when a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights 
violation, he serves “as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that Congress 
considered of the highest priority.” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011). Fee shifting 
pursuant to §1988, the Court noted, “at once reimburses plaintiff for ‘what it cost 
him to vindicate civil rights,’ Riverside v. Riviera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-78 (1986), and 
holds to account ‘a violator of federal law.’” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978). 
34
 United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998). 
35
 Id. at 71. 
36
 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 
37
 If, however, the officer-defendant claims the doctrine of qualified immunity, 
the respective plaintiff must prove: (1) the officer-defendant’s conduct violated a 
constitutional right; and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of its 
alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Pearson v. 
9
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standard, requiring an affirmative link between the misconduct 
complained of and the official sued.
38
  Individual liability has also 
been extended to those who, acting under color of state law, ignored a 
realistic opportunity to intervene while other officers acted illegally.
39
  
Despite the expansion of the ways in which a party may bring a 
§1983 claim against officers who have conducted an unreasonable 
search, plaintiffs bringing such claims nevertheless run into practical 
problems. In such circumstances, and pursuant to standard police 
protocol, plaintiffs are typically restrained and moved away from the 
officers conducting the search. While arguably necessary in most 
cases, that practice also effectively immunizes officers from property 
damage claims by preventing a prospective plaintiff from observing 
the officer responsible for the damage. As a result of the competing 
interests inherent in successfully showing an “affirmative link” 
between the named officer-defendant and the alleged misconduct in 
such circumstances, federal circuit courts of appeals vary greatly on 
exactly what a prospective plaintiff should be required to plead and/or 
prove in order to satisfy the individual liability requirement under 
§1983.  
In fact, the Seventh Circuit itself seems to differentiate 
analogous cases with little to no explanation, requiring detailed 
identification in some cases,
40
 while accepting general identification in 
others.
41
 In an attempt to aid prospective plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit 
has suggested that a plaintiff might allege a “conspiracy of silence 
                                                                                                                   
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (reconsidering the Saucier procedure, holding 
that while the sequence set forth therein is often appropriate, it should no longer be 
regarded as mandatory in all cases). The inquiry turns on the “objective legal 
reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly 
established at the time it was undertaken,” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244, and must be 
analyzed “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.  
38
 Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F. 2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983). 
39
 Miller v. Smith, 220 F. 3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000). 
40
 See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003); Hessel 
v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir. 1992). 
41
 See Miller, 220 F. 3d 491. 
10
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 in order to strengthen a claim against individual 
officers, yet has only found that allegation to be essential in certain 
circumstances, giving little to no guidance as to when a plaintiff is so 
required. 
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits, by contrast, have offered an 
alternative approach that restores the balance of power between civil 
rights plaintiffs and police officer defendants.
43
 Recognizing the 
inherent imbalance of power between police officer defendants and 
civil rights plaintiffs, federal courts in those circuits allow the burden 
of production to shift to defendant-officers at the discovery stage of 
litigation, while leaving the ultimate burden of proof with the civil 
rights plaintiff in the §1983 context.
44
 Pursuant to that approach, the 
Sixth Circuit has held that once a plaintiff has named certain officers 
as being liable for the deprivation of his or her constitutional rights 
either directly or by ignoring a reasonable opportunity to intervene in 
their fellow officers’ misconduct, those officers are required to then 
come forth with evidence that negates that plaintiff’s allegation.
45
 The 
Ninth Circuit has echoed that approach, shifting the burden of 
production to defendants in cases in which the respective plaintiff 
cannot learn the identity of the officers involved in the alleged 







                                                 
42
 See Molina, 325 F. 3d at 974; see also Hessel, 977 F. 2d at 305 (affirming 
summary judgment for defendant officers, despite recognizing the plaintiffs’ “bind,” 
in part because plaintiffs had “alleged no conspiracy”). 
43
 See e.g. Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F. 3d 610 (6th Cir. 2013); see also e.g. 




 See Burley, 729 F. 3d 610. 
46
 See Dubner, 266 F. 3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff may 
make a prima facie case simply by showing that her arrest was conducted without a 
valid warrant, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to provide some 
evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause). 
11
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2. Malicious Prosecution 
 
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit to disallow an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizure to continue beyond legal process so as to permit a federal 
malicious prosecution claim premised on the Fourth Amendment.
47
 
Thus, while 42 U.S.C. §1983 provides a legal remedy for the violation 
of constitutional rights conferred in the Fourth Amendment, those 
within the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction who seek compensation based 
on the initiation of unlawful criminal proceedings must bring a state 
common law claim for the intentional tort of malicious prosecution.  
Police officers may be held liable for malicious prosecution if 
they either signed a criminal complaint or “played a significant role in 
causing the prosecution of the plaintiff, provided all of the elements of 
the tort are present.”
48
 To state a claim for malicious prosecution under 
Illinois law, plaintiffs must establish: (1) the commencement or 
continuance of an original proceeding by the defendant; (2) the 
termination of that proceeding in favor of the plaintiff; (3) the absence 
of probable cause; (4) the presence of malice; and (5) damages.
49
 The 
absence of any one of those elements bars a plaintiff from pursuing the 
claim,
50
 and of those five elements, plaintiffs bringing malicious 
prosecution claims routinely encounter evidentiary and procedural 
difficulties in all but the issue of damages.
51
    
                                                 
47
 See Eric J. Wunsch, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment—
Malicious Prosecution and 1983: Is There a Constitutional Violation Remediable 
under Section 1983, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 878 (1994-1995); see also 
Albright v. Oliver, 975 F. 2d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 510 U.S. 266 
(1994) (affirming Seventh Circuit’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint because 
Illinois provides a tort remedy for malicious prosecution, thereby negating the need 
for a federal remedy). 
48
 Rodgers v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 340, 348-49 
(2000), citing 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution §§ 18, 19 (1987).  
49




 See Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 
286 (1997) (noting that the elements requiring favorable termination of a plaintiff’s 
criminal proceeding and malice are “no easy hurdle for the plaintiff” and that “[a]n 
12
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Under Illinois law, prosecution for a misdemeanor may be 
commenced by indictment, information, or complaint,
52
 while 
prosecution for a felony is initiated only by information or indictment, 
the former of which requires a finding of probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing.
53
 The sole purpose of preliminary proceedings is 
to ascertain whether a crime charged has been committed and, if so, 
whether there is probable cause to believe that it was committed by the 
accused.
54
 Yet because the standard applied to preliminary hearings is 
not the same as that applied in a criminal defendant’s subsequent trial, 
“a finding of probable cause [at a preliminary hearing] is not binding 
upon the subsequent grand jury.”
55
  
In a presumed effort to better articulate what is required in 
order to establish a defendant officer’s initiation of criminal 
proceedings, the Seventh Circuit has effectively placed an extra hurdle 
before plaintiffs bringing those claims against police officer 
defendants, supported at least in part by a footnote in Justice 
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Albright v. Oliver.
56
 Accordingly, 
conceding that “it is conceivable that a wrongful arrest could be the 
first step towards a malicious prosecution,” the Seventh Circuit 
requires plaintiffs to establish a “chain of causation” between a police 
officer’s actions and a State’s Attorney’s resultant prosecution. An 
established “chain of causation,” however, is broken by an indictment, 
                                                                                                                   
action for malicious prosecution remains one that is disfavored in law.”); see also 
Louis A. Lehr, Jr., PREMISES LIABILITY 3D §2:18 (2014 ed.) (stating “[m]alicious 
prosecution is one of the most difficult causes of action to prove and many cases go 
down in flames by a directed verdict if not sooner by a summary judgment.”). 
52








 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 279 n.5 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(“a malicious prosecution action against police officers is anomalous,” because 
“[t]he principal player in carrying out a prosecution – in ‘the formal commencement 
of a criminal proceeding,’ – is not police officer but prosecutor.”). 
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While “prima facie probable cause” is established by the grand 
jury’s return of the indictment, “it is not conclusive evidence of 
probable cause.”
58
 Rather, that presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence such as proof that the indictment was obtained by false or 
fraudulent testimony before the grand jury, or by failing to make a full 
or complete statement of the facts, or by other improper or fraudulent 
means.”
59
 Yet, because the issue of probable cause is litigated months 
after the arrest, an arresting officer can merely deny a plaintiff’s claim 
and is afforded time to gather evidence that could arguably and 
retroactively support his defense of probable cause.  
Additionally, for malicious prosecution purposes, criminal 
proceedings do not terminate, and a criminal defendant’s malicious 
prosecution claim does not accrue “until such time as the State [is] 
precluded from seeking reinstatement of the charges,”
60
 which the 
Supreme Court of Illinois has held is consistent with the expiration of 
the statutory speedy-trial period.
61
 Illinois courts have parsed through 
the various dispositions that can arise from preliminary hearings, 
concluding that “a favorable termination is limited to only those legal 
                                                 
57
 The question of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Whether 
the circumstances showing probable cause are proven is a question of fact, but, if 
true, whether they amount to probable cause is a question of law to be decided by the 
court. Ely v. National Super Markets, Inc., 149 Ill. App. 3d 752, 758 (1986); see also 
Norris v. Ferro, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32722, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2009) 
(noting the Seventh Circuit’s statement in Askew v. City of Chicago that “material” 
inconsistencies create jury questions, and denying summary judgment on false arrest 
claim where questions regarding defendant officer’s “credibility” were “so 
substantial that at the summary judgment stage,” the court could not accept any of 
his testimony). 
58
 Freides v. Sani-Mode Mfg. Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 296 (1965). 
59
 54 C.J.S. Malicious Prosecution, § 35 (1987); Freides, 33 Ill. 2d at 296 
(emphasis added). 
60
 Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 104 (2004). 
61
 Every person in custody in [Illinois] for an alleged offense shall be tried by 
the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into 
custody. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a). 
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dispositions that can give rise to an inference of lack of probable 
cause.”
62
 Importantly, “an order of dismissal for lack of probable 
cause is not an acquittal and is not final, as the State may later indict 
the accused or submit a new information.”
63
 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s “chain of causation” requirement 
appears to summarily demand a plaintiff prove most of the elements of 
the claim for malicious prosecution in one fell swoop, thereby 
providing numerous loopholes through which a plaintiff may fall. That 
high burden for plaintiffs is further compounded by the “liberalized” 
standards applied to summary judgment, which have resulted in an 
imbalance of power between plaintiffs and defendants, particularly in 
cases where defendant police officers are the movants against 
plaintiffs alleging officer misconduct in violation of their 
constitutional rights. 
 
B. Summary Judgment 
 
 At its inception, as articulated by the Supreme Court, summary 
judgment was designed to protect courts from “frivolous defen[s]es” 
and “to defeat attempts to use formal pleading as a means to delay the 
recovery of just demands.”
64
 The codification of the Federal Rules of 
Civil in 1938, however, expanded the application of the summary 
judgment motion, making it available as a broad-scale tool for the 
entry of a final decree on the merits of all claims before the federal 
courts.
65
 This significant alteration of American jurisprudence was 
treated warily by federal judges, who collectively perceived it as 
“threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the right to 
confront witnesses, the right of the jury to make inferences and 
                                                 
62
 Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology Int’l, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 278 
(1997). 
63
 People v. Zook, 177 Ill. App. 3d 62, 63 (1988). 
64
 Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 320 (1902). 
65
 Id. at 76. 
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determinations of credibility, and the right to have one’s cause 
advocated by counsel before a jury.”
66
  
Prior to the 1986 Trilogy, the leading summary judgment case 
was Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., which involved a conspiracy claim 
arising out of the refusal of luncheonette service to, and subsequent 
arrest of, a white civil rights worker in Mississippi.
 67
 The record 
contained allegations that the arresting policeman had been in the store 
when service was refused, but the plaintiff offered no specific 
evidence as to any conspiratorial activity. Defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment was nevertheless properly denied, the Court held, 
because “the affidavits of record did not foreclose a possible inference 
of a conspiracy by the jury from the fact that the policeman was 
present at the time that service was refused.”
68
 Accordingly, under the 
standard developed in Adickes, both the burden of proof and the full 




 The first of the Court’s Trilogy, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
fundamentally altered the Adickes standard by recasting the moving 
party’s burden of production to comport with the ultimate burden of 
proof the movant would have at trial.
70
 In so doing, the Court opened 
the door to pretrial adjudication on the merits, regardless of whether 
the district court judge would be constitutionally empowered to sit as 
                                                 
66
 Id. at 77. 
67
 Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In fact, it has been said 
that, despite the liberalization of the summary judgment motion after the Supreme 
Court’s 1986 Trilogy, Adickes was the key precedent for the Court’s decision in 
Tolan v. Cotton, discussed infra, because it was “the quintessential ‘he said, she 
said’ summary judgment case.” Denise K. Berry, Snap Judgment: Recognizing the 
Propriety and Pitfalls of Direct Judicial Review of Audiovisual Evidence at 
Summary Judgment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3343, 3346 (2015). 
68
 Adickes, 398 U.S. at 153 (the Court stated that such an inference could not 
be foreclosed from the factual allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint, finding that 
the defendant had failed to carry its burden of showing the absence of any genuine 
issue of fact). 
69
Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About 
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J., 73, 81 (1990). 
70
 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 
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the ultimate trier of fact at trial.  The Court’s transformation of the 
motion for summary judgment did not stop there. Rather, while the 
Court’s holding in Celotex facilitated the process of bringing a 
summary judgment motion before the court, its subsequent decisions 
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
71
 and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp.
72
 increased the chances of a trial court granting 
summary judgment in favor of a defendant-movant by allowing broad 
pretrial evidentiary review, thereby expanding the discretionary 
authority given to the district courts.
73
  
In Anderson, the Court recast summary judgment into the mold 
of a motion for a directed verdict.
74
 Yet as Justice William J. Brennan 
observed in his dissenting opinion, that approach marked a significant 
departure from the traditional view that “the measurement of the 
‘caliber and quality’ of evidence ‘could only be performed by 
weighing the evidence.’”
75
 Accordingly, Justice Brennan concluded 
that the Court’s opinion was full of language which he feared “could 
surely be understood as an invitation–if not an instruction–to trial 
courts to assess and weigh evidence as much as a juror would.”
7677
  
                                                 
71
 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
72
 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
73
Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, 84.  
74
 Miller, supra note 17, at 44-45 (noting that the Court’s decision in Anderson 
allows a district court to enter judgment if the evidence produced by the plaintiff is 
not sufficient to convince the judge that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in 
his favor).  
75
 Id. at 266 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
76
 Id. (emphasis added). 
77
 Motions for summary judgment after the Trilogy have presented a 
fundamental conundrum: issues of credibility are supposed to be decided by the jury, 
but in order to decide if the proof is enough for a “reasonable juror,” the judge must 
implicitly decide issues of credibility. The impetus of Justice Brennan’s point was 
that he could not at once “square the direction that the judge ‘is not himself to weigh 
the evidence’ with the direction that the judge also bear in mind the ‘quantum’ of 
proof required and consider whether the evidence is of sufficient ‘caliber and 
quantity’ to meet that ‘quantum.’” Id. Further, Justice Brennan feared that the 
Court’s holding would transform what is meant to provide an expedited “summary” 
procedure into a full-blown paper trial on the merits. Id. at 266-67. This fear seems 
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Moreover, in Matsushita, the Court reached into the realm of 
fact-finding in upholding a grant of summary judgment against the 
plaintiffs despite the submission of detailed and unrebutted expert 
reports supporting plaintiffs’ claims.
78
 The Court’s holding triggered 
yet another vigorous dissent, this time by Justice Byron White, who 
read the majority opinion to be an “invitation to the district judge to go 
beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for 




Thus, while the Court’s liberalization of the summary 
judgment standard was intended to control both the volume and scope 
of litigation in any particular case, the Trilogy’s impact has gone far 
beyond this desired screening.
80
 One of the unanticipated 
consequences of the Trilogy has been the alteration in the balance of 
power between plaintiffs and defendants in the pretrial phases of 
litigation. The Trilogy tipped this balance in favor of defendants by 
raising both the costs and risks to plaintiffs while diminishing both for 
defendants, who as a class tend to be wealthier and more powerful 
than plaintiffs and are typically the beneficiaries of summary 
judgment.
81
 Accordingly, summary judgment after the Trilogy remains 
a “powerful but blunt instrument,”
82
 as it is not sufficiently finely-
honed to distinguish sharply between genuine strike suits,
83
 and cases 
                                                                                                                   
properly placed in the civil rights context, where jury trials result in considerably 
more favorable verdicts for civil rights plaintiffs than bench trials. Schneider, supra 
note 14, at 564.  
78
 See Matshushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 
(1986). 
79
 Id. at 600 (White, J. dissenting). 
80
 Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, at 74; Bouillion v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 677 F. Supp. 467, 471 (W.D. La. 1988) (quoting Norris v. Bell Helicopter 
Textron, 495 So. 2d 976, 982 (La. App. 1986), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 85 (La. 
1987)).  
81
 Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, at 75; Miller, supra note 17, at 
47-48.   
82
 Id. at 107. 
83
 Cases initiated with the intention of extorting a payment from the defendant 
by threatening a costly legal battle. Issacharoff & Loewestein, supra note 69, at 106. 
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of limited monetary value.
84
 Many lawsuits aimed at remedying 
constitutional violations fall squarely into the latter category. 
More importantly, critics of the Trilogy have argued that, in 
deciding those three cases, the Court conferred too much discretion 
upon trial judges, essentially transforming them into pretrial 
factfinders.
85
 A post-Trilogy review of lower court decisions proves 
that courts have shown a new willingness to resolve issues of intent or 
motive at the summary judgment stage, and, in the extreme version, to 
grant summary judgment where “taken as a whole, [plaintiff’s 
evidence does not] exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair 
amount of certainty.”
86
 In fact, considerable evidence supports the 
proposition that federal courts across the nation have taken Matsushita 
and Anderson as the invitation the respective dissenting justices so 
feared.
87
 This development is particularly troubling in civil rights 
cases, which most commonly involve subtle issues of credibility, 




Although the tension between the procedure’s screening value 
and the desire to protect the nonmovant has always been present in 
motions brought pursuant to Rule 50, it is heightened in the summary 
judgment context because of the more limited evidentiary record and 
the lack of any opportunity to evaluate witness credibility.
89
 When 
                                                 
84
 Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 69, at 107. 
85
 Miller, supra note 17, 47-48.  
86






 Miller, supra note 17, at 61; see also UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F. 2d 
871 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990) (holding, in the 
context of a sex discrimination case challenging the exclusion of women of child-
bearing age from industrial positions, that despite the conflicts on material issues 
absolutely central to the disputed exclusion, the plaintiffs failed to survive summary 
judgment). Judge Posner dissented, opining, “I think it a mistake to suppose that we 
can decide this case once and for all on so meager a record,” before emphasizing that 
“whether a particular policy is unlawful is a question of fact that should ordinarily be 
resolved at trial.” Id. at 902, 906. The Supreme Court agreed, reversing and 
remanding that case in part because “if the Court of Appeals had properly analyzed 
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viewing evidentiary material on a pretrial motion without the 
safeguards and environment of a trial setting, courts may be tempted to 
treat the evidence in a piecemeal rather than cumulative fashion, draw 
inferences against the nonmoving party, or discount the nonmoving 
party’s evidence by weighing it against contradictory evidence.
90
 
Further, today’s rhetoric about the “litigation explosion”
91
 may be 
encouraging district courts and courts of appeals to rely on the Trilogy 
to justify resorting to pretrial disposition too readily because they 
believe that there is a pressing need to alleviate overcrowded dockets 
or because they disfavor certain substantive claims.
92
 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tolan v. Cotton, 
however, evidences the Court’s renewed emphasis on the proper role 
of a district court in the summary judgment stages of litigation, 
especially in civil rights cases involving purely testimonial evidence.
93
 
                                                                                                                   
the evidence, it would have concluded that summary judgment against petitioners 
was not appropriate because there was a dispute over a material issue of fact.” Int’l 
Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 222 (1991). 
90
 Miller, supra note 17, at 62. Miller goes on to say that, “[e]ncouraged by 
systemic concerns suggesting that summary judgment is desirably efficient, judges 
may be motivated to seek out weaknesses in the nonmovant’s evidence, effectively 
reversing the historic approach.” Id. at 66.  
91
 Miller, supra note 17, at 110.  
92
 Id. Miller also notes that “[j]udges are human, and their personal sense of 
whether a plaintiff’s claims seem ‘implausible’ can subconsciously infiltrate even 
the more careful analysis.” Id. at 66.  
93
 In Tolan, an officer stopped Tolan in front of his parents’ home in Bellaire, 
Texas on the mistaken belief that the car he had been driving with his cousin was 
stolen. 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014). Tolan told the officers that the car belonged to 
him, and after a few minutes, Tolan’s parents, hearing the commotion, came outside. 
Id. His parents reiterated what Tolan had already told the officer and confirmed that 
Tolan lived with them. Id. A sergeant then arrived on the scene and ordered Tolan’s 
mother to stand against the garage door. Id. at 1863-64. The officer stated that Tolan 
rose to his feet from the facedown position in which the officer had ordered Tolan to 
remain, while Tolan testified that he rose to his knees. Id. at 1864. The parties agreed 
that Tolan then exclaimed “Get your fucking hands off my mom,” at which point the 
sergeant on scene shot Tolan three times. Id. Granting summary judgment to the 
officer-defendants, the district court relied on several disputed facts, including (1) 
the lighting of the porch, (2) how calmly Tolan’s mother disputed the officers’ 
allegations, (3) whether Tolan was “verbally threatening” the officer, and (4) 
20
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The facts of Tolan, as viewed by the Court, led to the inescapable 
conclusion that the court below credited the evidence of the party 
seeking summary judgment—police officers—and failed to properly 
acknowledge key evidence offered by the party opposing that 
motion—a young black man shot at the hands of one of those officers. 
It is natural, the Court noted, for witnesses on both sides to have their 
own “perceptions, recollections, and even potential biases,”
94
 but, the 
Court continued, “by weighing the evidence and reaching factual 
inferences contrary to Tolan’s competent evidence, the court below 
neglected to adhere to the fundamental principle that at the summary 
judgment stage, reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the 
nonmoving party.”
95
 Failing to heed the Court’s warnings in Tolan, 
both the district court and the Seventh Circuit majority neglected to 
adhere to that same fundamental procedural tenet when it issued its 
opinion in Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al. just three years later. 
 
COLBERT V. WILLINGHAM, ET AL. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
In March of 2011, Plaintiff Jai Crutcher was discharged on 
mandatory supervised release after being incarcerated periodically for 
various offenses.
96
 After his release, Crutcher and his girlfriend moved 
in with Christopher Colbert, Crutcher’s brother by adoption, who lived 
in the West Englewood neighborhood of Chicago.
97
 As part of the 
terms of his supervised release, Crutcher was required to “consent to a 
                                                                                                                   
whether Tolan was “moving to intervene” in the sergeant’s interaction with his 
mother. Id. at 1867. Because the lower court failed to credit evidence that 
contradicted some of its key factual conclusions, the Court found that the Fifth 
Circuit improperly “weighed evidence” and “resolved disputed issues in favor of the 
moving party.” Id. at 1866. 
94
 Id. at 1868. 
95
 Id.  
96
 Colbert v. Willingham et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
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search of [his] person, property, or residence”
98
 and agreed that he 
“w[ould] not use or knowingly have under [his] control or in [his] 
residence any firearms, ammunition, or explosive devices.”
99
  
 Shortly after Crutcher was released on parole, Defendant 
Chicago Police Officer Russel Willingham (“Willingham”) allegedly 
received information from a “cooperating individual” who claimed to 
have seen Crutcher in Colbert’s residence with two firearms: a 12-
gauge shotgun and a 40-caliber handgun.
100
 Defendant Willingham ran 
a name check on Crutcher, which revealed that he was on parole for 
the use of a firearm.
101
 Based exclusively on that information, 
Willingham contacted Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) 
Parole Officer Jack Tweedle (“Tweedle”), and the two decided to 
conduct a parole check of Crutcher’s residence to ensure that he was in 
compliance with the terms of his supervised release.
102
  
 At 6:30 a.m. on March 31, 2011, no fewer than 10 police and 
parole officers arrived at Colbert’s home to conduct that compliance 
check.
103
 Asleep in the basement at the time, Crutcher woke to the 
officers’ knock on the front door of the residence he shared with 
Colbert.
104
 Willingham, Tweedle, and IDOC Officers Luis Hopkins 
and Darryl Johnson (collectively, “Defendant Officers”), were among 
the group of agents.
105
 Crutcher looked outside and, seeing the 
enormous police presence, called Colbert at work to apprise him of the 
officers’ arrival. Crutcher let the officers in “several minutes later” and 




                                                 
98
 Id. at *2-3.  
99








 Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2017). 
104
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 Before beginning the search, the officers handcuffed 
Crutcher.
107
 At some point during the search, Colbert arrived home 
and was also placed in handcuffs.
108
 As a result, neither Colbert nor 
Crutcher was permitted to observe the search, which encompassed the 
totality of the home.
109
 While both Plaintiffs were handcuffed and 
secured, the reporting officers ravaged the home, causing damage to 
both real and personal property.
110
  
Specifically, the officers pulled out insulation in the basement, 
put holes in the walls, ripped the couch open to search its contents, and 
tracked dog feces throughout the house.
111
 In the kitchen on the main 
floor, officers ransacked various food containers (i.e. a sugar bowl), 
broke part of the kitchen countertop, and broke hinges off of 
shelves.
112
 Additionally, Plaintiffs described an officer who un-
holstered his firearm and threatened to shoot Crutcher’s six-week-old 
puppy before leaving the dog outside, where it was lost.
113
  
 Just before concluding their search, the officers encountered the 
bedroom Colbert shared with his wife on the main floor, which was 
locked.
114
 The officers obtained a key and, once inside, found a 12-
gauge shotgun in the closet with approximately 100 rounds of 
ammunition and a box for a 40-caliber semi-automatic handgun.
115
 
Colbert admitted ownership of both firearms, neither of which was 




 Id. at *4-5. 
109
 Id. at *42. 
110






 Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F. 3d 649, 661 (7th Cir. 2017) (Hamilton, 
J., dissenting). In addition to the property damage referenced by the district court, 
Plaintiffs testified that the officers damaged clothing, a weight bench, the basement 
door, the steps, bedroom dressers, and an electronic tablet. Crutcher testified that the 
officers dismantled his stereo and television, damaging them in the process, and 
destroyed photographs of his grandmother, leaving them on the floor covered in dog 
feces. Colbert, 651 F. 3d at 661, n.1 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
114
 Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *5. 
115
 Id. at *6. 
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registered with the City of Chicago, at which point the officers 




B. Procedural Background 
 
Crutcher was arrested for Unlawful Use of a Weapon/Felon in 
Possession of a Firearm
117
 and Violation of Parole.
118
 Officer 
Willingham prepared and submitted a criminal complaint against 
Crutcher in which he stated that Crutcher had admitted to “full 
knowledge of the firearm being in the residence” as well as to 
knowledge that a handgun had previously been in the residence.
119
 
That prosecution ended on April 19, 2011, after a Cook County judge 
dismissed the case on a finding of no probable cause,
120
 but on May 6, 
2011, an Illinois grand jury nevertheless indicted Crutcher on one 
count of being an armed habitual criminal and two counts of unlawful 
possession of a firearm by a felon.
121
 Crutcher was found not guilty on 




Colbert was arrested for failing to register his firearm pursuant 
to §8-20-140 of Chicago’s Municipal Code
123
 and an accompanying 




 Required Crutcher to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his 
land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any firearm or firearm 
ammunition. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-1.1(a) (LexisNexis 2017). 
118
 Required Willingham to have reasonable suspicion that Crutcher knowingly 
had a firearm or ammunition in his residence. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/3-3-9 
(2017); Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *6.  
119
 Id. at *31. 
120
 Id. at *2.  
121
 Id.  
122
 Id., at *6-7.  
123
 Due to what Willingham calls “a scrivener’s error,” instead of charging 
Colbert under §8-20-140, the official charge listed on Colbert’s arrest report was §8-
20-040, a statute declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010). Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67561, at *38.  
24
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state-law charge for possessing a shotgun able to hold over three 
rounds pursuant to 520 ILCS 5/2.33(m).
124
 Colbert was released from 




Plaintiffs Crutcher and Colbert filed their first complaint with 
the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, on March 31, 2013, 
later amending it twice.
126
 Colbert alleged (1) a false arrest claim 
against all individual Defendant Officers, (2) that §8-20-040 of the 
Municipal Code of the City of Chicago was unconstitutional, and (3) 
an unreasonable search claim.
127
 Plaintiff Crutcher alleged (1) a false 
arrest claim against all individual Defendant Officers, and (2) a 




The City and Willingham moved for summary judgment on all 
claims, arguing: (1) Willingham had the requisite probable cause to 
arrest both Crutcher and Colbert or, in the alternative, Willingham had 
“arguable probable cause,” entitling him to qualified immunity on the 
Plaintiffs’ respective false arrest claims; (2) Crutcher’s malicious 
prosecution claim against Willingham and the City with respect to 
Crutcher’s first criminal proceeding was time-barred and that the 
requisite “chain of causation” applied to Crutcher’s second proceeding 
was broken by his indictment by the grand jury or, in the alternative, 
Willingham’s arrest and subsequent criminal complaint were 
supported by probable cause, barring Crutcher from relief as a matter 
of law; and (3) Colbert’s unreasonable search claim failed because 
there was no evidence that Willingham was personally involved in the 
destruction of Colbert’s property.
129
  
                                                 
124
 Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *7. 
125
 Id. at *7-8.  
126
 Complaint, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 
(N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 2397).  
127
 Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *35. 
128
 Id. at *10-11. 
129
 See Motion of Defendants City of Chicago and Chicago Police Officer 
Russel Willingham for Summary Judgment, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394). 
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 IDOC agents Tweedle, Johnson and Hopkins also moved for 
summary judgment on all claims, asserting that the agents could not be 
held liable for: (1)  Crutcher’s arrest because it was Willingham and 
the other Chicago Police Officers who arrested Crutcher; and (2) 
Colbert’s property damage claim because Colbert had failed to provide 
any evidence about the condition of the property before the search and 
because Colbert failed to provide any description of the officers who 
allegedly damaged his property.
130
 Colbert and Crutcher moved for 





C. Statements of “Un”Disputed Material Facts 
 
When ruling on motions for summary judgment, federal courts 
in the Northern District of Illinois obtain the material facts of the case 
from the parties’ respective Local Rule 56.1 statements.
132
 Those 
statements filed by the respective parties in Colbert, and their answers, 
collectively proved that numerous facts were in dispute between the 
parties. Those which are material and therefore relevant to the 
respective plaintiffs’ claims are summarized below.  
First, Willingham stated that the “cooperating individual” upon 
whom he relied informed him that he or she had personally seen 
                                                 
130
 See Memorandum of Defendants Jack Tweedle, Darryl Johnson and Louis 
Hopkins in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394). 
131
 Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 
26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394). In his motion for partial summary judgment, Colbert 
for the first time asserted that the registration requirements under §8-20-140, the 
ordinance actually underlying Colbert’s arrest, were unconstitutional. In response to 
Colbert’s claim, Willingham submitted an affidavit stating that Colbert had been 
arrested for violating §8-20-140, but Willingham had erroneously marked §8-20-040 
as the cause of arrest. The district court accepted Willingham’s explanation and 
granted summary judgment to Defendants on Colbert’s false arrest claim. Colbert v. 
City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, this article 
does not discuss that claim. 
132
 Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F. 3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
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Crutcher repeatedly with two firearms—a 12-gauge shotgun and a 40-
caliber handgun—while s/he was present in the home he shared with 
Colbert.
133
 Willingham claimed that the individual had provided him 
with reliable information in the past.
134
 Crutcher disputed the 
individual’s reliability because Willingham could not recall how many 
times he had received information from that individual prior to the 
search and had not made any reports about information the individual 
had provided him in the past nor the information provided to him prior 
to his search of plaintiffs’ residence.
135
 Further, Crutcher argued that 
because Willingham asserted privilege and refused to disclose what, if 
anything, the individual had told him about how he or she came to be 
inside of Crutcher’s residence, and also relied on that privilege to 
support his refusal to disclose how many times that individual claimed 
to have been inside Crutcher’s residence, the alleged “information” 
was uncorroborated, and thus Willingham should have been barred 
from using the evidence about the “tip” to support his “reasonable 
suspicion” or “probable cause” finding(s).
136
 
Relatedly, the parties disputed the circumstances of the 
officers’ visit. First, the parties disputed the length of Crutcher’s 
“delay” in answering the door. Crutcher testified it was approximately 
four minutes, while the Defendant Officers claimed it was between 
fifteen and twenty minutes.
137
 Additionally, plaintiffs disputed the true 
purpose of the officers’ visit.
138
 Willingham claimed the purpose was 
                                                 
133
 Defendant Chicago Police Officer Russel Willingham’s Reply to Plaintiff’s 
Response to Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at 
¶6, Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 




 Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1(b) Statement in Response to ECF #70, at ¶6, 
Colbert v. Willingham, et al., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) 




 Colbert v. Willingham, et al., No. 13 Civ. 394, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67561, at *16 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015). 
138
 Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 666 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
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to ensure Crutcher was in compliance with the terms of his supervised 
release with respect to gun possession, yet Crutcher stated that he 
planned to dispute Willingham’s intent at trial because, as Crutcher 
testified at his deposition, when Willingham first entered the home he 
asked “[w]here’s the diesel?”
139
 and reported that he had received a tip 
“that [they] had some drugs,”
140
 before accusing Crutcher of flushing 
them down the toilet.
141
 Crutcher also pointed to the fact that as the 
officers searched through the house, they further indicated they were 
looking for drugs by looking through the sugar container in the kitchen 
and tearing apart the couch in the basement where Crutcher slept as it 




Additionally, while Willingham claimed that Crutcher had 
admitted to “full knowledge of the firearm being in the residence” as 
well as to knowing that a handgun had previously been in the 
residence—claims he included in his arrest report—Crutcher testified 
that he neither admitted to knowing nor knew that a firearm had been 
in the house.
143
 Further, Crutcher testified that, after asking him about 
drugs, Willingham told Crutcher that he knew the shotgun was 
Colbert’s, but said “since you didn’t give me the information I needed, 
guess what? The shotgun is yours. [Hopkins] found it on you.”
144
 




 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was undoubtedly a 
dispute over whether the named Defendant Officers were the same 
officers who caused the damage to Colbert’s property or, at the very 
                                                 
139
 “Diesel” is slang for cocaine. 
140




 Id.  
143
Plaintiff’s Consolidated Statement of Additional Facts, at ¶24-25, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394). 
144
 Id. at ¶26.   
145
 IDOC Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Consolidated Statement of 
Additional Facts, at ¶26, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) 
(No. 13 Civ. 394). 
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least, ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene while other officers 
caused the property damage. Colbert’s second amended complaint 
named all four Defendant Officers. Willingham admitted the damage 
occurred, but claimed he was not personally responsible.
146
 The IDOC 
Defendants, by contrast, claimed to have no recollection of the 




COLBERT V. WILLINGHAM, ET AL. – THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION 
 
A. Jai Crutcher 
 
1. False Arrest 
 
Beginning its analysis of Crutcher’s Fourth Amendment false 
arrest claim, the district court stated that a warrantless search or 
seizure of a parolee’s person or belongings “can occur where the 
officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
148
 Accordingly, 
the relevant inquiry was whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, Willingham had reasonable suspicion that Crutcher had 
committed or was committing either of the two crimes for which he 
was arrested or any crime at all.
149
  
 Before answering that inquiry in the affirmative, the district 
court first stated that the fact that the officers found the shotgun in 
Colbert’s locked bedroom affected the analysis of whether Crutcher 
knowingly resided in a home with a firearm.
150
 Nonetheless, the court 
found that Willingham had the requisite reasonable and articulable 
suspicion to support Crutcher’s arrest based on: (1) knowledge that 
Crutcher was on parole for the use of a firearm, (2) information from 
                                                 
146
 Defendant Chicago Police Officer Russel Willingham’s Reply to Plaintiff’s 
Response to Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, at 
¶15, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015) (No. 13 Civ. 394). 
147
 Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F.3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting).  
148




 Id. at *15. 
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an informant relating that Crutcher had been in his residence with 
multiple firearms, including a shotgun, (3) the amount of time it took 
Crutcher to answer the door, and (4) the discovery of corroborating 
evidence (the shotgun that Defendant Officers found in Colbert’s 
locked bedroom after a full search of the residence).
151
  
In analyzing the disputed length of Crutcher’s delay in opening 
the door for the officers, the court differentiated between a “significant 
delay,” which would be sufficient to increase an officer’s suspicion,
152
 
and a “two-minute delay,” which would be an immaterial fact that 
would not contribute to finding reasonable suspicion, before 
concluding Crutcher’s delay belonged in the former category.
153
 
Notably, the court did not explicitly state that a four minute delay is 
“significant,” nor did it explain what led to its conclusion. Instead, the 
court bypassed that inquiry, the dispute over which would normally be 
considered a matter of credibility, and merely asserted that the delay 
was relevant “based on its duration,” Crutcher’s status as a parolee, the 
tip Willingham allegedly received, and the alleged purpose of the 
investigation.
154
 Apart from Crutcher’s parolee status, each of the 
factors upon which the court relied were sources of dispute among the 
parties. The court thus could not have decided the issue as a matter of 
law without accepting the Defendant Officers’ version of the facts as 
true.  
Finally, while the district court agreed with Plaintiffs’ 
contention that Willingham failed to provide evidence sufficient to 
establish the reliability of the “cooperating individual” from whom he 
received the tip about Crutcher possession guns, and therefore treated 
the individual like an anonymous tipster, the court nevertheless 
concluded that the Defendant Officers’ discovery of the specific 
firearm allegedly mentioned in the tip—the fruit of their search—was 




 United States v. Charleston, No. 14 CR 009, 2014 WL 1329419, at *12 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 1, 2014). 
153
 United States v. Crasper, 472 F. 3d 1141, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). 
154
 Colbert v. Willingham et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67561, at *15 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015). 
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sufficient to retroactively corroborate the tip.
155
 Thus, the court 
seemingly used one contested fact to validate the next before 
summarily concluding that no dispute of material fact remained. 
 
2. Malicious Prosecution 
 
Before analyzing the merits of Crutcher’s malicious 
prosecution claim against Willingham and the City, the district court 
resolved a dispute between the parties regarding the date Crutcher’s 
claim accrued. Defendant Officers contended that Crutcher’s 
malicious prosecution claim accrued on April 19, 2011, when the state 
court judge issued a finding of no probable cause following Crutcher’s 
preliminary hearing.
156
 Crutcher, by contrast, argued that his claim 
accrued in February 28, 2012, when he was found not guilty of the 
charges brought via his subsequent grand jury indictment.
157
 Thus, the 
question for the court was whether the two criminal prosecutions 
against Crutcher, which stemmed from the same arrest and were 
premised on the same operative facts and police reports, should be 
treated as separate actions or as a single action.  
The district court concluded that the two prosecutions brought 
against Crutcher should be considered separately, thereby time-barring 
any action based on Crutcher’s first criminal proceeding. 
Consequently, because the court found that “[t]he grand jury 
indictment of Crutcher [was] prima facie evidence of probable cause,” 
Crutcher was required to present evidence “such as proof that the 
indictment was obtained by false or fraudulent testimony before the 
grand jury or other improper or fraudulent means,” in the second 
matter in order to rebut that presumption.
158
 
                                                 
155
 Id. at *17. 
156
 Id. at *24. 
157
 Id. at *24. 
158
 Id. at *30 (citing Freides v. Sani-Mode Mfg. Co., 33 Ill. 2d 291, 296 
(1965); Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F. 3d 892, 901 
(7th Cir. 2001)). 
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But by artificially separating the two criminal proceedings, the 
court discounted Crutcher’s argument that the two criminal 
proceedings had been initiated by one arrest and one police report for 
crimes different only in degree, which left the “chain of causation” 
intact. The court’s determination on that issue thus allowed it to 
conclude that Crutcher’s allegation of Willingham’s “improper act”—
his drafting of a police report containing false statements regarding the 
facts of Crutcher’s arrest—related only to the initial, time-barred 
prosecution. Even in the light most favorable to Crutcher, the court 
stated, there was no evidence that Willingham had any influence over 





B. Christopher Colbert 
 
Disagreeing with the IDOC Defendants, the court found that 
because Colbert alleged specific facts describing how the police 
damaged specific items within his home, and because Willingham 
admitted those allegations, there existed a disputed issue of fact 
materially sufficient to withstand summary judgment on those 
grounds.
160
 Adhering to its strict individual liability standard for 
claims arising under §1983, however, the district court granted 
summary judgment to Defendant Officers because Colbert failed to 
provide evidence sufficient to establish an affirmative link between 
any individual Defendant Officer and the damage caused.
161
 
Importantly, the court found Colbert’s argument that “[t]he question of 
which officers were responsible for trashing Colbert’s home should be 
left to the jury” unconvincing, citing Hessel v. O’Hearn
162
 for the 
principle that while it may be assumed that the property damage was 
                                                 
159
 Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *32. 
160
 Id. at *42. 
161
 Id. at *44. 
162
 Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (asserting that “the 
principle of collective punishment is not generally part of our law.”). 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/2




caused by one or more of the officers who searched Colbert’s home, 




COLBERT V. CITY OF CHICAGO, ET AL. – THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
DECISION 
 
Exhibiting the same uncritical approach to the disputed issues of 
fact material to Plaintiffs’ claims and failing to review the lower 
court’s ruling de novo, in Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., a divided 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant Officer-Appellees. Judge Joel Flaum, 
writing for the majority, was joined by Judge William Bauer, while 




A. The Majority Opinion 
 
1. Jai Crutcher – Malicious Prosecution 
 
Beginning its analysis of Crutcher’s malicious prosecution claim 
with a footnote, the Seventh Circuit majority failed to review the lower 
court’s treatment of Crutcher’s underlying criminal proceedings as two 
separate actions despite owing no deference to the trial court’s legal 
conclusion. In so doing, however, the Seventh Circuit majority both 
ignored the fact that the court’s artificial separation of those 
proceedings ran counter to established law and discounted the 
dispositive effect of the district court’s legal conclusion by conflating 
two elements of Crutcher’s claim.
165
  
First, by failing to review the separation de novo, the majority 
neglected to adhere to the axiom that criminal proceedings do not 
terminate, and a criminal defendant’s malicious prosecution claim 
does not accrue, “until such time as the State [is] precluded from 
                                                 
163
 Colbert, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67561, at *45 (citing Hessel, 977 F. 2d at 
305). 
164
 Colbert v. City of Chicago, et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2017). 
165
 Id. at 654, n.5. 
33
: Crediting the Incredible: How the Seventh Circuit Uses Procedure
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017




seeking reinstatement of the charges.”
166
 The record explicitly showed 
that the State was not only permitted to seek reinstatement of the 
charges against Crutcher, but that it did in fact reinstate the charges 
against Crutcher that resulted from the officers’ search of his residence 
on March 31, 2011, less than one month after the circuit court judge’s 
“no probable cause” finding.
167
 
More importantly, the majority predicated its judgment as a 
matter of law in favor of the Defendant Officers on the ultimate 
catchall: a broken “chain of causation.”
168
 Because Crutcher was 
subsequently indicted on charges stemming from his arrest on March 
31, 2011, the court concluded that the chain of causation linking 
Willingham’s arrest to Crutcher’s prosecution had been broken.
169
 
Though the majority admitted that Willingham’s allegedly false 
statement in the original case incident report he drafted constituted a 
post-arrest action, it nevertheless found that there was simply no 
evidence that the statement influenced the prosecutor’s decision to 
indict, or that the prosecutor relied on the contents of the report to 
obtain the indictment for Crutcher’s second proceeding.
170
 In support, 
the court pointed to the fact that Willingham had not testified before 
the grand jury and found that Crutcher failed to provide any evidence 




Yet by focusing on the fact that Crutcher pointed to no evidence 
that Willingham committed perjury before the grand jury, the majority 
misapprehended the ways in which plaintiffs may rebut the 
presumption that an indictment is prima facie evidence of probable 
cause. The Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly addressed the issue of 
what may constitute a post-arrest “improper act” sufficient to leave the 
chain of causation intact, stating that “[n]o decision of the court ever 
                                                 
166
 Ferguson v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d 94, 104 (2004). 
167
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 653. 
168
 Id. at 654, n.5. 
169
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has restricted the rebutting evidence solely to proof of false or 
incomplete testimony” because no such “insuperable burden . . . would 
serve the ends of justice.”
172
 The Seventh Circuit majority thus 
improperly narrowed its analysis and refused to credit Crutcher’s 
testimony, which supported the allegation that Willingham committed 
an improper act by knowingly misrepresenting facts that satisfied a 
required element of the offense for which Crutcher was subsequently 
charged and indicted. 
Moreover, the court went on to muse that, “it [was] likely that the 
prosecutor knew that a judge had already dismissed Willingham’s 
complaint, which was based in part on th[at] arrest report, for lack of 
probable cause.”
173
 In so doing, however, the majority refused to 
confront the implausibility of its assumption. A grand jury entered a 
finding of no probable cause to indict Crutcher on two charges: one 
which required proof that Crutcher knowingly resided in a home with 
a firearm, the other which required proof that he had actual or 
constructive possession of a firearm.
174
 Crutcher was subsequently 




The record is incontrovertibly devoid of evidence prior to the 
Defendant Officers’ search. Even the alleged tip which triggered 
Willingham and Tweedle to conduct the search of Crutcher’s 
residence failed to appear in the record until Crutcher had already been 
taken into custody.
176
 According to the lower court, that anonymous 
tip and Crutcher’s “delay” formed the requisite reasonable suspicion 
for the Defendant Officers’ search, which in turn afforded them the 
opportunity to find the firearms in Colbert’s locked bedroom.
177
 Those 
facts, taken as true, would likely be sufficient to show actual 
                                                 
172








 Id. at 666 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
177
 Colbert v. Willingham, et al., No. 13 Civ. 2397, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
67561, at *20-21 (N.D. Ill. May 26, 2015). 
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possession. Crutcher’s false confession, in turn, supports constructive 
possession.  
Yet it was patently impossible for the prosecutor to discover any 
one of those facts independent from Crutcher’s arrest report, where 
they were all memorialized in writing by Willingham. Furthermore, 
Willingham testified in his deposition that he “related the facts of the 
case” to the prosecutor.
178
 Not one of the Defendant Officers offered 
any evidence tending to prove that the prosecutor’s decision to charge 
Crutcher was the result of his or her independent investigation. The 
majority did not explain what evidence a prosecutor might have had to 
support an indictment for possession other than the evidence that was 
exclusively within Willingham’s control. Nonetheless, the court 
conclusively determined that there was no evidence that Willingham’s 
arrest report played any part in Crutcher’s second criminal proceeding 
which stemmed from the same operative facts as the first.
179
  
Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the Seventh Circuit 
majority remained unperturbed by the fact that the only place from 
which evidence could be found supporting probable cause sufficient to 
initiate and continue Crutcher’s second criminal proceeding was 
within Willingham’s arrest report, which Crutcher alleged was 
falsified. Consequently, the district court’s decision to separate 
Crutcher’s two criminal proceedings was thus far from irrelevant. 
Rather, that decision effectively barred evidence of Willingham’s 
post-arrest improper act. The majority thus tacitly deferred to 
Defendant Officers’ version of events, and neglected to credit 
Crutcher’s sworn testimony denying the veracity of salient facts in 
Willingham’s arrest report from playing any role in his malicious 
prosecution claim. As a result, the presumption of probable cause 
inherent in Crutcher’s indictment remained unrebutted. Consequently, 
by way of a procedural technicality, the majority avoided crediting 
testimony of the non-moving party, and, as a result, was not forced to 
explicitly state what it implicitly had done.  
                                                 
178
 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 22, Colbert v. City of Chicago et al. (7th Cir. 
Nov. 2, 2016) (No. 16-1362). 
179
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 655. 
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2. Christopher Colbert – Unreasonable Search  
 
Applying the test enunciated in Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist,
180
 the 
Seventh Circuit majority found Colbert unable to satisfy §1983’s 
personal liability requirement due to the lack of an affirmative link 
between the individuals sued and the misconduct alleged.
181
 
Particularly problematic for the court was the fact that Colbert sued 
four of ten searching officers, while admitting that he was unable to 
identify which officer had caused which type of property damage.
182
 
Unmoved by the fact that Colbert’s failure was a direct result of his 
removal from the rooms in which the officers were conducting the 
search, the majority concluded that because the officers denied 
personal responsibility and Colbert put forth “no evidence” to support 
his claim against them, no dispute of material fact remained.
183
  
 The court did, however, recognize the “potential tension between 
§1983’s individuality responsibility requirement and factual scenarios 
of the kind present [in this case].”
184
 In its attempt to provide a 
solution for that inherent problem, however, the majority merely 
reiterated its prior suggestion to plaintiffs in two cases the court 
believed to be factually similar. First, in Hessel v. O’Hearn, a case in 
which officers allegedly stole items during a search of plaintiff’s 
house, the court for the first time “recognized the plaintiff’s bind,”
185
 
but affirmed summary judgment for defendant officers because the 
plaintiffs had “alleged no conspiracy.”
186
 Delving into the realm of 
fact-finding, the court opined that “[t]here is no more reason to fix 
                                                 
180
 Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F. 2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that 
because §1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated 
upon fault, “a causal connection, or affirmative link, between the misconduct 
complained of and the official sued is necessary.”).  
181
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 657. 
182
 Id. at 659. 
183
 Id. at 660. 
184
 Id. at 657. 
185
 Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 305 (7th Cir. 1992). 
186
 Id.  
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liability on [those] 14 police officers than on the entire population of 
Horicon, Wisconsin,”
187
 later qualifying that with “[w]ell, maybe a 
little more reason.”
188
 Nonetheless, the court surmised that because 
“[e]ach of the defendants c[ould] deny liability, a jury may find it 
impossible to determine who is lying,”
189
 the plaintiff was not entitled 
to relief as a matter of law,
190
 thereby evidencing a propensity to 
improperly weigh evidence at the summary judgment stage.   
Similarly, in Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper,
191
 the court 
suggested that plaintiffs in such a “bind” might allege “something akin 
to a ‘conspiracy of silence among the officers,’ in which defendants 
refuse to disclose which of them has injured the plaintiff.”
192
 But 
because the officer named in Molina’s lawsuit was one of seventeen 
officers and because the plaintiff failed to specifically articulate a 
conspiracy among the officers, the court boldly asserted that, “[n]o 
jury could reasonably infer . . . that [the named officer] caused the 
damage to the truck.”
193
 In so doing, the court refused to acknowledge 
the important role a jury plays—that of making credibility 
determinations at trial.   
Thus, under the pretense of Colbert’s inability to satisfy the causal 
connection requirement, the court ignored the specific circumstances 
of Colbert’s case and held that because Colbert had not specifically 
alleged “anything like a ‘conspiracy of silence’ . . . no jury could 
reasonably conclude that these particular Defendant Officers had any 
individual involvement in Colbert’s alleged property damage.”
194
 This 
most recent holding evidences a willingness to dismiss cases in which 
a plaintiff has offered undisputed direct evidence of extensive property 
damage as a result of an unreasonable search and circumstantial 










 Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003). 
192
 Id. at 974. 
193
 Id.  
194
 Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 658 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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evidence supporting the plaintiff’s argument that the officers failed to 
intervene on the pretense that no reasonable juror would believe the 
plaintiff standing before him. Regardless of the underlying intent, the 
resultant principle is that in cases in which a plaintiff is unable, due to 
the searching officers’ own conduct, to provide evidence of an 
officer’s direct involvement in the alleged misconduct, that claim 
necessarily must fail unless that plaintiff specifically pleads a 
conspiracy of silence in his or her complaint. 
Recognizing the paradox of its assertion that plaintiffs in 
Colbert’s situation are required to plead a specific phrase in order to 
survive summary judgment, the majority explicitly refuted the natural 
implication of its holding by stating “[t]his is not to suggest that 
plaintiffs in this context must plead a legal theory.”
195
 Rather, the 
court indicated, those plaintiffs must plead a claim that plausibly 
forms a causal connection between the officer sued and some alleged 
misconduct and introduce facts that give rise to a genuine dispute 
regarding that connection, bringing the impossibility of producing 
such evidence full circle.
196
 As such, the Seventh Circuit majority’s 
conclusion left much to be desired, particularly because Colbert’s 
evidentiary showing seemed to meet that stated requirement.  
Colbert’s alternative argument alleging that the named officers at 
the very least failed to intervene was met with the same fate. The 
Seventh Circuit erroneously concluded that the Colbert’s case was 
easily distinguishable from its precedent, Miller v. Smith,
197
  based on 
no more than a circumstantial technicality.
198
 This artificial 
differentiation evidenced the majority’s refusal to take a critical look 
at the facts of a specific civil rights plaintiff’s case using a “totality of 
the circumstances” approach, preferring instead to boil down those 






 Miller v. Smith, 220 F. 3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000). 
198
 The majority seemed to differentiate the facts of Miller from those of 
Colbert based on the fact that, though the plaintiff in Miller “could not identify 
which of the two officers had used excessive force, he did identify the remaining for 
officers who stood by and, as a result, ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene.” 
Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 660 (emphasis in the original). 
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facts and place the respective plaintiff in a category into which he may 
or may not belong. As a result, the court found that Colbert’s assertion 
that the four named Defendant Officers caused the damage, or at least 
failed to intervene when they had a realistic opportunity to do so, 
proven in part by circumstances such as the loud volume of the 
destructive search coupled with the undisputedly small home, was 
simply insufficient to dispute the Defendant Officers’ respective 
claims that “it wasn’t me.”  
 
B. Judge David Hamilton’s Dissent 
 
The first sentence of Judge David Hamilton’s dissenting opinion 
in Colbert v. Chicago summarily described the majority’s error, 
stating “[t]he factual account provided by Crutcher and Colbert may or 
may not be true, but that question is not before us.”
199
 Implicitly 
attacking the rose-tinted glasses with which the majority read the 
Defendant Officers’ barebones denial of all responsibility, Judge 
Hamilton reminded his colleagues that their duty in reviewing 
summary judgments is to treat the evidence of the nonmoving party as 
true and give them the benefit of all reasonable inferences from that 
evidence.
200
 Further, recognizing the gravity of the issue presented, 
Judge Hamilton properly framed the case at bar as one which raises 
larger questions about how courts should address claims of law 
enforcement misconduct, putting special emphasis on claims brought 
by people of color, who are disproportionately subject to police 
misconduct.
201
 For Judge Hamilton, the issues raised in Colbert almost 
exclusively involved credibility determinations, which the majority 
either resolved themselves or summarily avoided by standing behind a 
proverbial shield of procedure.  
First, Judge Hamilton took issue with the majority’s suggestion 
that plaintiffs who hope to survive summary judgment after being 
subjected to an unreasonable search or seizure during which they are 
                                                 
199
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effectively blindfolded should, in general, allege a “conspiracy of 
silence” to strengthen their claim.
202
 Recognizing that the majority’s 
suggestion was founded on Hessel and Molina, Judge Hamilton 
clarified that nothing in those cases stood for the proposition that 
plaintiffs in Colbert’s position are required to meet a new pleading 
requirement.
203
 As a result, compelling a civil rights plaintiff to plead 
a fact patently obvious to every Chicago resident would require that 
plaintiff to interpret the Seventh Circuit’s suggestion as an actual 
pleading and/or evidentiary prerequisite. Yet neither Hessel nor 
Molina took a firm stance on that issue, and by categorizing Colbert as 
a Hessel/Molina case, the Seventh Circuit majority failed to recognize 
critical differences between those factual scenarios.  
The fourteen officers in Hessel conducted a search of plaintiffs’ 
premises for evidence of illegal gambling pursuant to a valid 
warrant.
204
 Plaintiffs claimed that the officers exceeded the scope of 
that warrant and stole items of property, including three cans of soda, 
an antique chest and an envelope with six hundred dollars of cash 
inside.
205
 Declining to reverse the lower court’s grant of summary 
judgment for the officers, the Seventh Circuit cited a “controversial 
decision” that came out of a case in California, in which the court held 
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be used to thwart a 
“conspiracy of silence” of medical personnel.
206
 Importantly, however, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded Hessel by stating, “[w]hether any such 




Further, in Molina, the court refused to credit plaintiffs’ attempt to 
name the officer they believed to be responsible for causing damage to 
their truck during the search.
208
 In so doing, however, the court stated 
                                                 
202




 Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). 
205
 Id.  
206
 Id. at 305 (citing Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486 (1944)). 
207
 Hessel, 977 F. 2d at 305.  
208
 See Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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that the facts of the plaintiffs’ case bore “a strong resemblance to those 
in Hessel,”
209
 thereby denying differentiation based on a “complete 
inability” in Hessel versus the “likely culprit” in Molina. What’s more, 
the only reference the Seventh Circuit made to a supposed pleading 
requirement in Molina was when they noted that the plaintiffs “ha[d] 
not alleged a conspiracy of silence among the officers (a move that 




Moreover, the majority’s “conspiracy” suggestion stands in stark 
contrast to the recognized principle that a plaintiff is not required to 
plead legal theories in his complaint and is inherently ironic given the 
immeasurably liberal pleading requirements applied to claims for 
conspiracy in the Seventh Circuit.
211
 In fact, by asserting that Colbert 
should have explicitly alleged a “conspiracy of silence,” the Seventh 
Circuit majority implicitly admitted the impossibility of Colbert’s 
situation. Because conspiracies are “by their nature shrouded in 
mystery,” courts have found that they “do not permit the plaintiff to 
allege, with complete particularity, all of the details of the conspiracy 
or the exact role of the defendants in the conspiracy.”
212
 A plaintiff 
cannot be required to “allege facts with precision where the necessary 
information to do so is within the knowledge and control of the 
defendant and unknown to the plaintiff.”
213
  
As a result, states under the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction merely 
require a plaintiff to allege the parties involved, the general purpose, 
and the approximate date of the conspiracy.
214
 Colbert incontrovertibly 
surpassed those minimal requirements. Further, Colbert’s brief 
explicitly stated that because both Plaintiffs expect each Defendant 
                                                 
209
 Id. at 973. 
210
 Id. at 974. 
211
 Walker v. Thompson, 288 F. 3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating “it is 
enough in pleading a conspiracy merely to indicate the parties, the general purpose, 
and approximate date, so that the defendant has notice of what he is charged with.”). 
212
 Adcock v. Brakegate Ltd., 164 Ill. 2d 54, 65-66 (1994) (emphasis added). 
213
 Id. at 66.  
214
 Loubster v. Thacker, 440 F. 3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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Officer to deny wrongdoing, the jury should be permitted to assess the 
credibility of those claims. “It is unclear,” Judge Hamilton opined, 




Judge Hamilton then contended that the majority also improperly 
denied Colbert’s claim that at a minimum, the four named officers 
failed to intervene when their fellow officers searched his home in an 
unreasonable manner. The majority stated that Colbert’s claim failed 
because he did not observe the officers failing to intervene. Noting that 
requiring an aggrieved plaintiff to observe officers failing to intervene 
would be a marked departure from circuit precedent, Judge Hamilton 
criticized the majority for its inconsistent and conflicting evidentiary 
requirements applied to individual liability under that theory.
216
  
In Miller v. Smith, the district court granted summary judgment to 
police officers on plaintiff’s claim of excessive force because Miller 
was unable to “identify the officers who allegedly attacked him or 
otherwise support his claim with sufficient facts.”
217
 The Seventh 
Circuit reversed, concluding, “[i]f Miller can show at trial that an 
officer attacked him where another officer ignored a realistic 
opportunity to intervene, he can recover.”
218
 The majority in Colbert 
attempted to differentiate Miller based on the fact that Miller 
“narrowed his excessive force allegation to two of the six arresting 
officers”
219
 and was able to identify the remaining four officers who 
stood by.
220
 Though Colbert narrowed his unreasonable search claim 
to four of the ten officers who were present during the search, this was 
not enough for the majority. Failing to understand the way in which 
                                                 
215
 Colbert v. City of Chicago et al., 851 F. 3d 649, 662 (7th Cir. 2017) 
(Hamilton, J. dissenting). 
216
 Id. at 664 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (citing Miller v. Smith, 220 F. 3d 491 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of 
§1983 if she acts or fails to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.”)). 
217
 Miller, 220 F. 3d at 493. 
218
 Id. at 495. 
219
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 661 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
220
 Id. at 660. 
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the two cases were distinguishable, Judge Hamilton argued that the 
Seventh Circuit should have taken the same approach to Colbert’s 
unreasonable search claim as it did to that of Miller.
221
  
If it had, the result would have been quite different for Colbert. 
Taking an approach consistent with Seventh Circuit precedent, Judge 
Hamilton analyzed the issue using the totality of the circumstances and 
pointed to factors such as the officers’ testimony, in which they stated 
that Colbert’s home was “a very small residence” and testimony that 
the officers’ search was “incredibly loud and disruptive, as one might 
expect when doors are torn from their hinges” to conclude that the four 
Defendant Officers must have been close to any other officer in the 
home.
222
 The Seventh Circuit required no more than that in Miller, yet 
inexplicably came to the opposite result in Colbert, finding Colbert’s 
case more similar to a case in which plaintiff complained about a 
stolen soda
223
 and one which involved a search of a truck,
224
 not a 
residence. Moreover, Judge Hamilton highlighted the dispositive issue 
of credibility the majority implicitly resolved, noting, “while the 
defendants might argue that they did not notice their colleagues in the 
next room putting holes in the walls, the plausibility of that argument 
should be a jury issue.”
225
   
Thus, rejecting the majority’s “conspiracy” suggestion, Judge 
Hamilton ventured to find a legitimate and instructive solution to a 
plaintiff’s predictable problem. In contrast to the majority, Judge 
Hamilton found persuasive the burden-shifting approach, which has 
been used in other circuits facing similar evidentiary issues and was 
propounded by Colbert.
226227
 In Burley v. Gagacki, the Sixth Circuit 
                                                 
221
 Id. at 664 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).  
222
 Id. at 655 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
223
 Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F. 2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1992). 
224
 Molina ex rel. Molina v. Cooper, 325 F. 3d 963, 973 (7th Cir. 2003). 
225
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 665 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).  
226
 The majority summarily dismissed Colbert’s proposed burden-shifting 
approach for two reasons: (1) the Seventh Circuit has never adopted such an 
approach; and (2) even using a burden-shifting approach, Colbert “at least would 
have needed to have sued all of the officers he had reason to believe were 
responsible for the alleged property damage.” Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 659. 
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permitted the district court to shift the burden of production on remand 
from plaintiff to defendants after the involved officers masked their 
identities before ransacking the plaintiff’s home, stating “while an 
officer’s mere presence at the scene of the search is insufficient” to 
establish individual liability under §1983, “here the agents’ intent to 
conceal contributed to plaintiffs’ impaired ability to identify them.”
228
  
Judge Hamilton then cited the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Dubner 
v. City and County of San Francisco,
229
 to clarify that such an 
approach is only a procedural adjustment, which shifts the burden of 
production based on the defendants’ own actions when they act 
together.
230
 Under this approach, a defendant seeking summary 
judgment is required to present evidence that he is not personally 
liable for the unreasonable search, either by identifying who caused 
the damage or through some other means. Importantly, if the officers 
fail to present exculpatory evidence, Judge Hamilton argued, the 
matter should proceed to trial so a jury can evaluate credibility.
231
 
With regard to Crutcher’s malicious prosecution claim, Judge 
Hamilton condemned the uncritical approach the majority took to 
conclude that Crutcher’s grand jury indictment broke the requisite 
chain of causation between Willingham and the alleged constitutional 
deprivation for two reasons. First, Judge Hamilton correctly clarified 
that Crutcher’s claim was based not on a wrongful arrest, but on 
Willingham’s alleged lie after the officers arrested him.
232
 Therefore, 
Crutcher’s claim was by definition premised on the malicious steps 
Willingham took to ensure Crutcher’s prosecution. Crutcher alleged 
                                                                                                                   
227
 Id. at 663 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
228
 Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F. 3d 610, 622 (6th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). 
229
 Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F. 3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 
2001) (holding that “although the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the unlawful 
arrest, she can make a prima facie case simply by showing that the arrest was 
conducted without a valid warrant. At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
provide some evidence that the arresting officers had probable cause for a 
warrantless arrest.”).  
230
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 664. 
231
 Id. at 663-64 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
232
 Id. at 665 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
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that Willingham signed his name to his arrest report, knowing that the 
report contained a patently false admission that formed the basis of 
one of the elements of both crimes for which Crutcher was charged. 
Accordingly, the chain of causation remained intact after Crutcher’s 
indictment in his second criminal proceeding. 
Second, Judge Hamilton criticized the Seventh Circuit majority 
for refusing to confront the implausibility of its assumption.
233
 
According to the majority, the prosecutor seeking the indictment for 
knowing possession of a firearm that was found in Colbert’s locked 
bedroom never presented the grand jury with information that 
Crutcher had confessed he knew the gun was in the home.
234
 Notably, 
the majority remained silent as to what other evidence the prosecutor 
could have offered that would have provided the probable cause 
necessary to indict Crutcher on charges requiring actual or 
constructive possession. As Judge Hamilton correctly noted, 
Willingham’s arrest report was the prosecutor’s “only evidence [in the 
record presented] that Crutcher knew about the gun in Colbert’s 
bedroom closet.”
235
 Consequently, finding it unlikely that a competent 
prosecutor would have failed to present that evidence to the grand 
jury, Judge Hamilton criticized the majority for making “such an 
improbable assumption in favor of the defense” in reviewing summary 
judgment for the defense.
236
  
Finally, the majority’s disposal of Crutcher’s claim based on the 
grand jury indictment allowed it to avoid addressing Defendant 
Officers’ argument that they had probable cause to arrest Crutcher. 
Whether Willingham reasonably believed that Crutcher either 
knowingly resided in a home with or actually or constructively 
possessed a firearm was one of the most hotly contested of the 
aforementioned disputed facts, the truth of which only a jury could 




 Id. (emphasis added). 
235
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 Understanding the pivotal role the probable cause 
analysis played in Crutcher’s malicious prosecution claim, Judge 




There were two genuine disputes of material fact that the majority 
simply avoided by finding a broken chain of causation. That chain of 
causation would have remained intact, however, had the majority 
declined to implicitly resolve several credibility determinations in 
favor of Willingham. First, Crutcher claimed that he did not know 
about the gun that was found in Colbert’s locked bedroom.
239
 
Willingham, by contrast, claimed that Crutcher confessed to 
knowing.
240
 Crutcher then testified denying that claim.
241
 Because 
Crutcher’s “knowledge” of the gun was highly relevant to whether 
Crutcher could have been found in constructive possession of a 
firearm, this conflicting evidence, Judge Hamilton concluded, 
presented a genuine issue of material fact.
242
  
Second, Defendant Officers attempted to lessen the impact of that 
genuine issue of material fact by arguing that the tip Willingham 
received about Crutcher being seen with a gun from a cooperating 
individual, combined with the corroborating evidence—the discovery 
of the gun itself—was also sufficient to establish probable cause.
243
 
Yet by relying on that cooperating individual, the majority’s holding 
showed a willingness to ignore several facts that called Willingham’s 
version of events into question. In fact, there existed significant 
                                                 
237
 See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring, 
Stevens J., dissenting) (stating “[w]hether a reasonable officer could have believed 
he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment or a 
directed verdict in a §1983 action based on the lack of probable cause is proper only 
if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach.”). 
238
 Colbert, 851 F. 3d at 665-66 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
239
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The parties did not dispute the fact that Willingham failed to 
provide any details about the purported reliability of the individual, 
“despite fervent questioning by Plaintiff’s counsel,”
245
 which forced 
the district court to treat the individual as an “anonymous tipster.”
246
 
An anonymous tipster, without more, is insufficient at law to establish 
probable cause.
247
 Worse yet, neither the majority nor the district court 
addressed the genuine dispute as to which came first, the search or the 
supposed tip.
248
 Willingham provided no evidence of the tip prior to 
the search. In fact, Willingham’s arrest report did not even document 
the alleged tip.
249
 Rather, the first mention of that tip was in 
Willingham’s case incident report, which was drafted after Crutcher 
was taken into custody—a fact that was compounded by Crutcher’s 
sworn testimony in which he stated that when the officers first arrived 
they were searching not for guns but for drugs.
250
  
Taken together, those determinations evidenced the Seventh 
Circuit majority’s perfunctory acceptance of the Defendant Officers’ 
version of events as undisputed despite testimonial evidence put forth 
by the nonmoving party that called the veracity of the officers’ 
testimony into question. The facts of Colbert, like those of Tolan, 
considered together, thus lead to the “inescapable conclusion” that the 
majority credited the evidence of the party seeking summary 
judgment—Chicago Police Officers—and failed to properly consider 
key evidence offered by the non-moving party—two black men, one 














 Id. As discussed infra, Crutcher supported his allegation that the officers 
were looking for drugs with specific statements Willingham made and actions the 
Defendant Officers took, including that Willingham said he had received a tip that 
“[they] had some drugs,” specifically cocaine, and searched through the sugar in 
Colbert’s kitchen. Id.  
48
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with a criminal conviction, living in a predominantly black 
neighborhood. In so doing, the court neglected to adhere to the 
fundamental principle that “at the summary judgment stage, all facts 







While the Department of Justice’s Investigation of the Chicago 
Police Department and the events preceding it have triggered the 
Mayor’s promise to redouble the City’s efforts to combat police 
misconduct,
252
 that type of response from the city’s chief executive is 
far from novel. The Chicago Police Department has cycled in and out 
of the national consciousness almost since its inception, yet its 
practices apparently have remained unchanged. Further, as the DOJ 
stated, “[w]hen officers falsify reports and affirmatively lie in 
interviews and testimony, this goes well beyond any passive code of 
silence; it constitutes a deliberate, fundamental, and corrosive 
violation of CPD policy that must be dealt with independently and 
without reservation if the City and the CPD are genuine in their efforts 
to have a functioning system of accountability that vindicates the 
rights of individuals who are abused by CPD officers.”
253
 
Thus, while it is encouraging that public outrage has forced the 
City to yet again commit to structural changes within the CPD, if we 
have learned anything from Chicago’s history, it is that the type of 
change this City so desperately needs will require cooperation from 
each branch of government. Included in that is the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Yet the way in which the Seventh 
Circuit has handled factual disputes between police officers defendants 
                                                 
251
 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014). 
252
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION & U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILL., supra note 1, 19 (Mayor Rahm Emmanuel responded 
by establishing the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF) and charged PATF 
with assessing and making recommendation for change in five years, including 
“oversight and accountability.”). Id. 
253
 Id. at 75. 
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and civil rights plaintiffs based largely upon incomplete pretrial 
records only perpetuates the already near impossible task of holding 
officers accountable for misconduct. 
 As meritorious claims of officer misconduct continue to be 
disposed of in the pretrial phases of litigation, officers are afforded the 
opportunity to patrol the streets of Chicago with a judicially fortified 
shield against liability for their unlawful actions. The judiciary must 
work together with the executive branch in order to effect meaningful 
change, rather than merely accepting officer misconduct—both prior 
and subsequent to an arrest—as an immutable trait inherent in the 
CPD. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit must heed the DOJ’s warnings 
against allowing and effectively encouraging officer misconduct to 
continue and resist the temptation to use procedural tools to validate 
the perfunctory grant of deference to Chicago Police Officers. At the 
very least, the Seventh Circuit must decline the invitation to go beyond 
the traditional summary judgment inquiry and instead allow 
meritorious claims of police misconduct to go to a jury. 
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